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Abstract
In a recent paper, John Wigglesworth explicates the notion of a set’s be-
ing grounded in or ontologically depending on its members by the modal
statement that in any world (possible or impossible), that a set exists in
that world entails that its members exist as well. After suggesting that
variable-domain S5 captures an appropriate account of metaphysical ne-
cessity, Wigglesworth purports to prove that in any set theory satisfying
the axiom Extensionality this condition holds, that is, that sets ontologi-
cally depend on their members with respect to extraordinarily weak no-
tions of set. This paper diagnoses a number of problems concerning Wig-
glesworth’s formal argument. For one, we will show that Wigglesworth’s
argument is invalid as it requires an appeal to hidden, extralogical theses
concerning rigid designation and the persistence of sets across possible
worlds. Having demonstrated the indispensability of these principles to
Wigglesworth’s argument, we will then show that even granted the en-
thymematic premises, the argument only proves the ontological depen-
dence of singletons on their members and does not extend to sets in gen-
eral. Finally, we will consider strengthenings of Wigglesworth’s reasoning
and suggest that even the weakest generalization will bear undesirable
consequences.
1 Introduction
That the existence of a set is grounded in the existence of its members is an
assertion frequently encountered in discussions of metaphysical grounding (cf.
[2] or [8]). Often, this claim is presented as an unambiguous illustration of
the phenomenon of grounding. This thesis receives a detailed examination
in John Wigglesworth’s recent paper [10], in which Wigglesworth sets out to
provide a demonstration that a set S ontologically depends on its members.
Wigglesworth’s characterization of ontological dependence is an asymmetric re-
lation, according to which the existence of a set entails the existence of its
members while the converse does not hold. We will not argue against the latter
clause, and concern ourselves with the first direction, which is recapitulated in
the language of modal logic as:
Ground It is necessary that if a set S exists, then every member of S exists.
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The majority of Wigglesworth’s paper is devoted to philosophical arguments
but the final pages of the paper are devoted to a formal proof that in every
variable-domain S5 model whose elements satisfy very weak conditions about
sets, Ground holds with respect to singletons. Moreover, Wigglesworth also
speculates that “there is reason to think”[10, 174] that the line of argument
provided extends to establish that Ground holds of all sets.
The aim of this paper is to make explicit a number of problems inherent to
Wigglesworth’s argument. Before identifying the problems, we will first review
the argument itself.
2 Examining Wigglesworth’s Argument
Over the course of [10], Wigglesworth argues that variable-domain first-order
S5 corresponds with metaphysical necessity and presumes S5 to serve as the
appropriate setting in which to seat talk of necessary properties of sets. We will
assume that this is correct in the sequel. The background logic is then defined
model-theoretically:
Definition 1. A variable-domain, first-order S5 model is a tuple 〈D,W,R, v〉
where:
• D is a nonempty set of individuals
• W is a nonempty set of worlds
• R = W ×W
• v is a function that
– assigns to each constant term t a denotation tδ ∈ D
– assigns to each w ∈W a domain Ew ⊆ D
– assigns to each n-ary relation symbol P an extension Pw ⊆ Dn
With slight notational modifications, Wigglesworth follows the presentation of
[7] with respect to the recursive definition of the forcing relation between worlds
and formulae. These conditions are familiar, but for details the reader is referred
to [7].
Wigglesworth understandably wishes to argue that Ground holds with re-
spect to even very weak understandings of set. In particular, Wigglesworth
intends for his result to hold for any objects satisfying the axiom of Extension-
ality, i.e.:
Extensionality ∀x∀y(∀z(z ε x↔ z ε y)→ x = y)
Before recapitulating the argument of [10], a brief note on notation: It is com-
mon when writing about formal accounts of set theory to use the same symbols
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in both the formal language and metalanguage. This frequently leads to am-
biguity. Rather than use the symbols “∈” and “∅” in both the object and
metalanguage, we will employ the symbols “ε” and “Λ” in our formal language
to denote a binary relation and a constant whose intended interpretations are
that of set membership and the empty set, respectively.
2.1 The Formal Argument
The structure of Wigglesworth’s argument is that of a reductio. A number of
prima facie plausible theses are paired with a formal sentence representing the
denial of Ground for singletons, and a contradiction is purportedly derived.
From this, the reader of [10] is intended to infer that the restriction of Ground
to the case of singletons must hold. The initial set-up for the argument as
Wigglesworth presents it is that with respect to some model M and possible
world w, the following hold:
1 w  E(a)
2 w  s = ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a))
3 For all w′, w′  ∀x∀y(∀z(z ε x↔ z ε y)→ x = y)
4 w 1 (¬E(a)→ ¬∃x∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a)))
The natural language equivalents of these assumptions can be described in the
following terms:
1′ The set a exists at w.
2′ The set s exists at w and is the unique singleton of s at w.
3′ Every w′ is a model of a set theory satisfying Extensionality.
4′ It is possible that the singleton containing a exists while a does not.
From these assumptions, Wigglesworth aims to prove a contradiction, entailing
that no model simultaneously satisfies 1–4.
With inessential changes to the order in which the contradictory conse-
quences are derived, we may easily follow the derivation of the putative contra-
diction. From 4, we are licensed to infer the existence of an accessible world w′
at which both:
5 w′  ¬E(a)
6 w′  ∃x∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a))
hold. By instantiating 6 on a new constant s′, Wigglesworth infers that:
7 w′  ∀y(y ε s′ ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a))
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Furthermore, as 5 has been assumed to hold, there is no possible element of the
domain of w′ that bears the relation ε to s′, i.e., we infer that:
8 w′  ¬∃x(x ε s′)
This is to say that at w′, s′ plays the role of the empty set. Now, Wigglesworth
introduces a constant Λ that by definition denotes the empty set. As we have
observed in 8, ¬∃x(x ε s′) holds at w′ and by definition ¬∃x(x ε Λ) holds at w′.
It follows that ∀z(z ε s′ ↔ z ε Λ) is true at w′ and on this basis, Wigglesworth
invokes 3—the validity of Extensionality—to infer the following:
9 w′  Λ = s′
Because s′ and Λ are constants, these terms are rigid designators, whence we
are licensed to infer that:
10 w′  (Λ = s′)
From 10 and the universality of the accessibility relation, we infer that:
11 w  Λ = s′
From 11, Wigglesworth now aims to infer the truth of the following formula at
w:
∀y(y ε s′ ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a))
It is at this juncture that Wigglesworth begins appealing to unorthodox theses
concerning the behavior of rigid designators introduced or baptized by means
of a definition. The first instance is when Wigglesworth asserts that because s′
was baptized by means of the description ιx.∀y(y ε x ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a)), its
referent must satisfy the open formula ∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y)∧y = a)) in any possible
world. Such an assertion might be thought of as a persistence criterion, as it
describes necessary conditions for a set—in this case, a singleton—to persist
across possible worlds.
For the purpose of reviewing Wigglesworth’s argument, it suffices to note
that the structure of the justification is “because the property ϕ is definitional
of t, this property should hold of t in every possible world.” The matter of the
types of properties and objects with respect to which this reasoning is valid will
be set aside for the moment. For now, the use of this persistence criterion in the
argument is restricted to the case of singletons. A very conservative explication
of the persistence criterion justifying this inference can be phrased:
Res-W1 If a term t is introduced by the description t =
ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y)∧
y = a)) then the formula ∀y(y ε t ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a)) is true in every
possible world at which E(t) holds.
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In simpler language, it is necessary that the referent of the denoting phrase “the
singleton of a” includes a as a member.1
Returning to the argument, the importance of Res-W1 is found in its li-
censing the inference from 11 to:
12 w  ∀y(y ε s′ ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a))
But in virtue of assumption 1, E(a) holds at w, and it is an easy consequence
of 12 to infer that:
13 w  ∃x(x ε s′)
To derive the contradiction he seeks, Wigglesworth again appeals to a persis-
tence criterion akin to Res-W1, this time applying it to the constant Λ instead
of s′. We will describe this principle as follows:
Res-W2 If a term t is introduced by the description t =
ιx.¬∃y(y ε x) then
the formula ¬∃y(y ε t) is true in every possible world at which E(t) holds.
In other words, the formula ¬∃y(y ε x) is “definitional” of Λ as well, as the term
Λ had been introduced as the unique element containing no members. Res-W2
entails the referent of Λ (i.e., Λ) will satisfy this formula at any world. Hence,
Λ will have no members at any world:
14 w  ¬∃x(x ε Λ)
By 11, the identity Λ = s′ holds at w, whence we cite the properties of identity
and substitute s′ for Λ, concluding:
15 w  ¬∃x(x ε s′)
And 13 and 15 are inconsistent with one another.
It follows, according to Wigglesworth, that the conjunction of assumptions
1–4 is inconsistent and a restricted instance of Ground holds. Wigglesworth
infers that every singleton {a} ontologically depends on the existence of a, and
this forms the basis for an informal argument that Ground is true in full
generality.
We will now proceed to identify several problems concerning the forego-
ing argument. First, we will describe a variable-domain S5 model satisfying
Wigglesworth’s conditions 1–4. The mutual consistency of these theses demon-
strates that Extensionality alone does not establish Ground in the case of sin-
gletons and shows the indispensability of the hidden premises Res-W1 and
1Res-W1 is represented here as a logical or linguistic thesis—rather than a metaphysical
thesis—and it is worth considering the justification for this interpretation. If Res-W1 is
interpreted as a metaphysical principle—that it is necessary that the set s (i.e., {a}) contains
a as its sole element—then the assumption is just another statement of Ground for singletons.
To interpret the assumption in this way would thus assume that Wigglesworth is begging the
question, for which reason we default to the linguistic interpretation.
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Res-W2 in Wigglesworth’s argument. We will then show that even supposing
that Res-W1 and Res-W2 hold, Extensionality in conjunction with these two
theses remains insufficient to extend the truth of Ground to all sets. Finally,
we will consider attempts to strengthen Res-W1 and Res-W2 to more gen-
eral principles and we will suggest that even the weakest possible generalization
carries consequences orthogonal to Wigglesworth’s aims.
2.2 The Indispensability of Res-W1 and Res-W2
To show that Wigglesworth must appeal to the principles Res-W1 and Res-
W2, we consider a formal model that meets Wigglesworth’s standards yet wit-
nesses an occasion of a singleton existing without its member. This will show
that Res-W1 and Res-W2 are indispensable to Wigglesworth’s proof that
Ground holds of singletons.
The model we will employ is very simple, with only two elements in its
domain:
Definition 2. The model M1 is 〈W,D,R, v〉 where:
• W consists of two worlds {w,w′}
• D consists of two elements {a, s} (denoted by a and s, respectively)
• R is W ×W
• v provides the interpretation so that:
– Ew = D and Ew′ = {s}
– εw = {〈a, s〉} and εw′ = ∅
We will show that insofar as elements a and s satisfy Extensionality, they qualify
as sets in the very modest sense Wigglesworth requires and that M witnesses a
case in which a singleton (s) does not ontologically depend on its member (a).
The upshot of this will be that Extensionality alone is not sufficient to ensure
the ontological dependence of sets upon their members.
We have noted that Wigglesworth assumes of sets only that they satisfy
Extensionality. In any counterexample, this bar must be met by all elements of
the domain. Let us first ensure that we are dealing with at least this meager
notion of set at all possible worlds:
Observation 1. ε satisfies Extensionality in both w and w′.
Proof. In w, the universal quantifiers range over {a, s}. Because a = a and
s = s are true at w, the evaluation of ∀x, y(∀z(z ε x ↔ z ε y) → x = y) thus
stands or falls with the truth or falsity of the conjunction of sentences ∀z(z ε
a ↔ z ε s) → a = s and ∀z(z ε s ↔ z ε a) → s = a. But ∀z(z ε s ↔ z ε a)
(and ∀z(z ε a ↔ z ε s)) are false because a ε s is true but a ε a is not. Hence,
Extensionality is true at w.
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In w′, the universal quantifiers range over {s}. So the evaluation of Exten-
sionality reduces to the evaluation of the sentence (s ε s ↔ s ε s) → s = s. As
w′  s = s, this sentence trivially holds, whence Extensionality holds at w′.
So at both w and w′, elements a and s are sets in the meager sense that Wig-
glesworth requires.
We may proceed to establish some further facts concerning the properties of
M1 and the existence of particular elements of the domain.
Observation 2. At w, E(a) and E(s) are true.
Proof. By construction of the model, a and s are members of the extension of
E at w.
Observation 3. At w′, ¬E(a) and E(s) are true.
Proof. The interpretation of E at w′ is the set {s}, i.e., a does not satisfy the
existence predicate E at w′ but s does.
Observation 4. At w′, ∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = a)) is true.
Proof. The quantifiers at w′ range over the set {s}, so the evaluation of this
formula reduces to the evaluation of the sentence s ε s↔ (E(s) ∧ s = a). Both
s ε s and E(s) ∧ s = a are false at w′, so the sentence asserting their material
equivalence is true.
From the foregoing observations, we may also observe that the singleton case of
Ground fails:
Observation 5. At w, ¬[¬E(a)→ ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = a))] is true.
Proof. By Observations 3 and 4, ¬E(a) ∧ ∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = a)) is true
at w′, whence ¬(¬E(a) → ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = a))) is true at w′. As
wRw′, it follows that ¬(¬E(a) → ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = a))) holds at
w.
At this point, the argument of [10] would have it that s is the unique element
satisfying the formula ¬∃y(y ε x) at w′ and infer from this that s must satisfy
this formula at w as well. This would then contradict the fact that s has a
member at w, and the suitability of M1 as a model would be rejected. But
the way in which we have defined the model makes clear that no such move is
available.
Within this model, at w′, s has the property associated with the definite de-
scription “the empty set” and at w, s does not have this property. Although this
may at first blush appear to be counterintuitive, there is nothing inconsistent
about this scenario.2 “The empty set” is a definite description, and (barring
2But perhaps this is not so counterintuitive. From the perspective of someone living at w′,
the model reflects an intuition that the empty set could have contained a member. It is not
clear that this is any more problematic than an assertion that an empty shoebox could have
contained a pair of shoes.
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Res-W2) there is no logical requirement that s answers to the same definite
description at all possible worlds, any more than there is a requirement that
Benjamin Franklin invents bifocals at every possible world.
At this point, we have provided a consistent model witnessing that the for-
mal sentences 1–4 are mutually satisfiable. But some ambiguity remains with
respect to the reading of Ground. It will behoove us to clear away this ambi-
guity before proceeding.
There are two ways that one could construe the sentence “if the singleton of
a exists in world w′ then its member exists in world w′.” In the first case—the
de re reading—the description “the singleton of a” is evaluated at the actual
world. In the second—the de dicto reading—the description “the singleton of
a” is given a local evaluation at each w′. More precisely, the de re reading can
be adequately phrased as:
• The individual satisfying the description “the singleton of a” is such that
if it exists at a world w′, then a exists there as well.
and the de dicto reading can be understood as:
• If at some world w′ there exists an individual satisfying the description
“the singleton of a,” then a exists there as well.
One might object to the admissibility of the countermodel M1 by suggesting
that the scope of the necessity operator in Ground has been mischaracterized.
Anticipating such an objection, we may confirm that both readings fail in the
countermodel.
Letting w stand in place of the actual world, on the de re reading, s is the
thing that actually satisfies the description ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ (E(x)∧x = a)). Then
we observe that the de re account fails:
Observation 6. w′  E(s) and w′ 1 E(a), i.e., s exists at w′ while a does not.
Proof. Immediate from construction of the model.
But the de dicto account, which requires that the existence of any referent to
the description ιx.∀y(y ε x ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a)) at w′ entails the existence of a,
fares as poorly.
Observation 7. w′  E( ιx.∀y(y ε x ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a))) and w′ 1 E(a), i.e.,
ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a)) exists at w′ while a does not.
Proof. At w′, no element bears ε to s nor does any element satisfy the formula
E(x) ∧ x = a. Hence, ∀x[x ε s↔ (E(x) ∧ x = a)] is true at w′. As s is the sole
element of Ew′ and s satisfies the open formula ∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a), this
entails that w′  E( ιx.∀y(y ε x ↔ (E(y) ∧ y = a))). As before, we also know
that w′ 1 E(a).
From these observations, it is clear that appeals to scope provide no aid to
Wigglesworth’s argument.
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3 Examining the Persistence Criteria
The foregoing has been intended to isolate flaws in Wigglesworth’s methodol-
ogy. We have shown that the enthymematic principles Res-W1 and Res-W2
are in fact necessary components of Wigglesworth’s argument, i.e., that absent
these extralogical principles, the set of premises Wigglesworth uses for reduc-
tio is consistent. In this section, we will prove that the principles Res-W1
and Res-W2 are insufficient to lift Ground to the case of all sets. Extending
Wigglesworth’s argument to show that Ground holds in full generality thus
requires much stronger assumptions.
3.1 The Insufficiency of Res-W1 and Res-W2
As before, we will rely on a variable-domain S5 model in order to prove the
consistency of a set of assumptions. In this case, the model to be constructed
will show that even if Res-W1 and Res-W2 are assumed, Extensionality is
consistent with a violation of Ground in the case of unordered triplets.
The model is defined as follows:
Definition 3. The variable-domain S5 model M2 is defined so that:
• W contains two worlds {w,w′}
• D contains elements {Λ, a, s, t} denoted by Λ, a, s, t, respectively
• R = W ×W
• v provides an interpretation so that:
– Ew = D and Ew′ = {Λ, a, t}
– εw = {〈Λ, a〉, 〈Λ, s〉, 〈Λ, t〉, 〈a, s〉, 〈a, t〉, 〈s, t〉}
– εw′ = {〈Λ, a〉, 〈Λ, t〉, 〈a, t〉}
A salient interpretation of the elements ofD at w can be provided by interpreting
D as the first few von Neumann ordinals, i.e., a reading in which Λ is understood
as the empty set ∅, a is interpreted as the singleton {∅}, s as the pair {∅, {∅}},
and t as the triplet {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}. Given the absence of s in Ew′ , however,
t plays the role of the pair {∅, {∅}} at w′.
First, let us confirm that we are working with an appropriate model. This
requires that we check that the domains of both worlds are indeed models of
Extensionality:
Observation 8. At both w and w′, Extensionality holds.
Proof. This may be easily confirmed by checking the extensions of the relation
ε at each world.
Now, we may confirm that the restricted assumptions Res-W1 and Res-W2
hold for M2 by the following two observations:
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Observation 9. w  (Λ = ιx.¬∃y(y ε x))
Proof. By consulting the interpretation of ε, it is easy to confirm that at both
w and w′ the only element to which no other element bears ε is Λ. Hence, in
every world, Λ = ιx.¬∃y(y ε x) is true.
Observation 10. w  (a = ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y) ∧ (y = Λ)))
Proof. As before, at both w and w′, a is the unique element whose only “mem-
ber” (i.e., element bearing relation ε to a) is Λ. Hence, at both worlds, a =
ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ (E(y)∧ (y = Λ)) is true, which in turn entails that the formula is
necessarily true at w.
M2 thus satisfies each of Wigglesworth’s enthymematic assumptions, entailing
that in this context, there is enough fodder for Wigglesworth’s argument to go
through. It follows that in M2, Ground does in fact hold of singletons.
Observation 11. w  [¬E(Λ)→ ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = Λ))]
Proof. At both w and w′, the sentence ¬E(Λ) is false, entailing that the condi-
tional ¬E(Λ) → ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = Λ)) is true at both worlds. As w
and w′ exhaust the domain of worlds, this is a necessary truth, whence we infer
that (¬E(Λ)→ ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ x = Λ))) holds at both worlds.
As a is the only singleton at either world, Ground holds for all singletons. In
other words, granted the assumption that both Res-W1 and Res-W2 hold, we
can assume that the singleton case of Ground would be correct.
Now, while the ontological dependence of singletons on their members is
attractive, the thesis of Ground is more frequently encountered as the un-
qualified assertion that all sets ontologically depend on their members. While
Wigglesworth refrains from offering a proof that this thesis holds in full gener-
ality, he suggests that the general structure of his argument should suffice to
provide a demonstration of the unqualified thesis:
There is also reason to think that the argument presented here can
be generalised to show that, beyond the case of singletons, all sets de-
pend on their members, and that this dependence is asymmetric.[10,
174]
However, M2 witnesses that the assumptions Res-W1 and Res-W2 are insuf-
ficient to lift the validity of Ground to all sets. The lifting of the property
to the set-theoretic multiverse in general will require stronger principles than
Wigglesworth assumes. In particular, although M2 satisfies both of the en-
thymematic assumptions employed by Wigglesworth, Ground fails in the case
of unordered triplets.
As a principle about triplets, Ground states that if any one of three elements
fails to exist, then the triplet containing them must fail to exist. A particular
instance of Ground for triplets will thus be:
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(¬(E(Λ) ∧ E(a) ∧ E(s))→ ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ (x = Λ ∨ x = a ∨ x = s)))
As a result, if this sentence fails to hold in M2, then Ground for triplets does
not follow from Extensionality even when augmented by the additional premises
Res-W1 and Res-W2.
Observation 12. At w′, the sentence ¬(E(Λ) ∧ E(a) ∧ E(s)) is true.
Proof. Because s /∈ Ew′ , the formula E(s) fails, rendering the conjunction false
and its negation true.
Observation 13. At w′, ¬(∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ (x = Λ ∨ x = a ∨ x = s))))
is false.
Proof. We begin by evaluating the sentence ∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x)∧ (x = Λ∨x =
a ∨ x = s))). Note first that the domain of quantification is finite and that
each element of the domain is associated with a constant. Hence, when we
instantiate the existential quantifier on t, the truth of the universal formula
∀x(x ε t ↔ (E(x) ∧ (x = Λ ∨ x = a ∨ x = s)) reduces to the truth of the
conjunction of the following sentences:
• Λ ε t↔ (E(Λ) ∧ (Λ = Λ ∨ Λ = a ∨ Λ = s))
• a ε t↔ (E(a) ∧ (a = Λ ∨ a = a ∨ a = s))
• t ε t↔ (E(t) ∧ (t = Λ ∨ t = a ∨ t = s))
In the first two cases, both Λ ε t and a ε t hold at w′, entailing that the left-
hand sides of the biconditionals are true. But both E(Λ) and E(a) hold—as
well as the trivial identities Λ = Λ and a = a—and the right-hand sides of the
respective biconditionals are also true. As both sides of the biconditionals have
identical truth values, the biconditionals themselves are true at w′.
In the third case, both t ε t and the disjunction t = Λ ∨ t = a ∨ t = s fail at
w′, whence both sides of the biconditional are false at w′. Hence, w′  s ε t↔
(E(s) ∧ (s = Λ ∨ s = a ∨ s = s)).
Thus, the formula ∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ (x = Λ ∨ x = a ∨ x = s))) is
true—and its negation is false—at w′.
These two observations immediately yield the failure of the aforementioned in-
stance of Ground for triplets.
Observation 14. At w, the formula
(¬(E(Λ) ∧ E(a) ∧ E(s))→ ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ (x = Λ ∨ x = a ∨ x = s)))
is false.
Proof. By Observations 12 and 13, we immediately infer that the sentence
¬(E(Λ) ∧ E(a) ∧ E(s))→ ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ (x = Λ ∨ x = a ∨ x = s))
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has a true antecedent and a false consequent and thus does not hold at w′.
Because wRw′, w′ serves as an accessible world at which the sentence fails,
whence we conclude that
(¬(E(Λ) ∧ E(a) ∧ E(s))→ ¬∃y∀x(x ε y ↔ (E(x) ∧ (x = Λ ∨ x = a ∨ x = s)))
fails at w.
3.2 Baptism by Definition and Rigid Designators
We have shown that the task of establishing that Ground holds of sets in
general—and not merely singletons—requires stronger principles than Wigglesworth
assumes. In this section, we will consider strengthening the persistence criteria
of Res-W1 and Res-W2 by extending them to a broader class of elements.
To return to the matter of the questionable inference, let us examine the
circumstances under which it is introduced. Wigglesworth’s defense of the stip-
ulation that the definition ιx.ϕ(x) under which a proper name t is introduced
should hold of the individual so named in all possible worlds appears in the
below passages:
This stipulation [i.e., Res-W1] is justified... because it ensures that
we are talking about the singleton of x. If {x} did not satisfy this
condition, we would not be talking about the singleton of x; we
would be talking about something else.[10, 167]
And:
[s′] is defined as the set that has as its members all and only those
objects that are identical to [a]. As this is definitional of [s′], it
should hold in every world, including w.[10, 173]
Upon closer inspection, the underlying principle invoked in these passages seems
to be a very unusual thesis. Wigglesworth appears to defend this inference
on epistemic grounds by suggesting that when we fix the reference of a term
by a description ιx.ϕ(x), then we would be unable to pick out its referent in
another possible world without access to that description. This position suggests
that—at least in certain cases—the description by which an individual term is
introduced remains the only path to its referent.
This principle is obviously too strong to be applied to terms in general, as
such a principle contradicts the very spirit of of rigid designation—a notion to
which Wigglesworth himself appeals. It is part and parcel of rigid designation
that once we have baptized a name by means of a description, the name itself
suffices to refer to the individual in any possible world. The rigidity of rigid
designation is precisely the thesis that after the initial baptism, no “guide” to
the individual is required apart from the name itself.
Hence, if left unrestricted, the persistence criteria that would be employed
in a suitable modification of the argument would lead to consequences that con-
tradict some very deeply held theses about modality and descriptions. To use
Australasian Journal of Logic (13:3) 2016, Article no. 1
53
the familiar Kripkean example of [6], of the descriptions “the first Postmaster
General of the United States” and “the inventor of bifocals,” a simple argu-
ment by introducing proper names (e.g., “Postmaster General” and “Bifocal
Inventor”) would lead to the necessity of the statement:
• ιx.x is the first Postmaster General = ιy.y invented bifocals
Perhaps the apparent unsuitability of the unrestricted principle is due to the
fact that Franklin is an object with which we are acquainted by ostension. The
tenor of Wigglesworth’s justification, on the other hand, seems to presuppose
that sets must be introduced definitionally.
But extending the criteria to all objects introduced by definition is itself far
too liberal, as there are objects whose denoting terms are fixed by definition and
yet seem to resist the type of persistence criteria employed by Wigglesworth. A
salient example, as Kripke notes in [6], is the case of Neptune. The reference
of the term “Neptune” was fixed by means of a definitional description (rather
than by ostension); we will continue to use the phrase “the planet causing such
and such discrepancies in the orbits of certain other planets” as a stand-in for
whatever Urbain Le Verrier employed. Now, suppose that one should encounter
the following passage in a paper on metaphysics:
In any possible world, Neptune causes such and such discrepancies
in the orbits of these planets because it ensures that we are talking
about Neptune. If Neptune did not cause these discrepancies, we
would not be talking about Neptune; we would be talking about
something else.
Such a passage seems to contradict all but the most trivial notion of modal-
ity. If this passage is to be rejected as absurd, this suggests that more severe
restrictions to such criteria are required.
3.3 Purely Set-Theoretical Persistence Criteria
Wigglesworth’s justification for Res-W1 and Res-W2 appeals only to general
intuitions about epistemology and intensionality, with no particularization to
the case of mathematical objects. This seems to entail that the guiding principle
to which Wigglesworth appeals is not restricted to merely mathematical entities.
Despite this, one might still object that the examples we have considered
in this section differ from the cases of {a} and ∅ insofar as they have made
use of empirical predicates. One could then argue that more general persis-
tence criteria fail in these cases due to, perhaps, the imprecision of empirical
properties, although the application of such persistence criteria in the realm of
mathematical objects holds without problems.
But such principles seem to fail in mathematical examples as well. Consider
the following strengthened criterion:
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Res-WM For any term t introduced by a description t =
ιx.ϕ(x) in the lan-
guage of set theory, the formula ϕ(t) is true in every possible world in
which E(t) is true.
This seems to be the weakest generalization strong enough to ensure that
Ground holds for all sets. In the particular case of set theory, very odd con-
sequences remain. While such a criterion permits one to identify sufficiently
many sets across possible worlds, the identification compelled by the adoption
Res-WM leads to a nearly Platonistic conception of set.
The adoption of this principle, in effect, would be equivalent to the intro-
duction of an axiom scheme such as:
Set Persistence ∃x∀y(y ε x↔ ϕ(y))→ (tϕ = ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ ϕ(y)))
where tϕ is a constant schematically correlated with an open formula of set
theory ϕ(y). In plain language, the scheme entails that whenever ϕ(y) defines
a set S, there exists a term tϕ that is “definitional” of S and guarantees the
transworld identity of all witnesses to ϕ(y).
This scheme appears at first blush to perform admirably. For example, the
foregoing has produced two models in which instances of Ground fails—the
model M1 witnessed a failure of Ground for singletons while M2 witnessed
a failure of Ground for triplets. As counterexamples to elements of Wig-
glesworth’s reasoning, any sufficient repairs to the argument must disqualify
these two models, and the axiom eliminates these counterexamples insofar as
there are instances of the axiom not satisfied by these models. When ϕ(y) is
defined as follows:
• ϕ1(y) =df E(y) ∧ y = a
M1 clearly does not verify this instance of Set Persistence. The validity of this
instance would entail that both w  tϕ1 = a and w′  tϕ1 = s hold. From this,
one would be able to infer that w  a = s, contradicting the the distinctness of
a and s.
Set Persistence is similarly effective against M2 with the selection of ϕ(y) in
which:
• ϕ2(y) =df E(y) ∧ (y = Λ ∨ y = a)
Recall that in M2, s serves as the unordered pair comprising elements Λ and
a at w and that this role is played by t at w′. The validity of this instance
of Res-WM would thus require that both w  tϕ2 = s and w′  tϕ2 = t, from
which one could infer easily that w  s = t. Hence, the adoption of a persistence
principle like Res-WM rules out M2 as a countermodel as well.
But it can easily be seen that this axiom has some unfortunate consequences.
Consider, for example, Go¨del’s constructible universe L, iteratively constructed
by taking the definable subsets of earlier stages. Accepting Set Persistence entails
that the constructible universe L and the von Neumann universe V cannot both
be models of ZF, with the force of metaphysical necessity.
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The set Vω is definable, so there is a definite description in the language of
set theory that corresponds to the formula x = ℘(Vω).
3 Let“x v y” serve as
an abbreviation for the formula ∀z(z ε x → z ε y). Then the following is an
instance of Set Persistence:
• ∃x∀y(y ε x↔ y v Vω)→ (t = ιx.∀y(y ε x↔ y v Vω)
That is, if there exists a power set of Vω, then t denotes that set. Both L and V
make true the antecedent of this sentence, so should Set Persistence be assumed,
both make true t = ιx.(y ε x↔ y v Vω), i.e., t = Vω+1.
In any discussion of possible worlds and models of set theory, it seems that
(presuming that ZF has a model), L and V ought to be considered paradigm
cases of possible ways that sets could be. Now, suppose that one constructs
an S5 model in which both L and V are possible worlds corresponding to their
statuses as “possible models” of ZF. Then as t denotes ℘(Vω) in both L and
in V, the same object must serve as the power set of Vω, that is, t rigidly
designates the same set in all possible worlds (in which “world” is taken to be
“possible model of ZF”).
But this is false; what L thinks answers to ℘(Vω)—i.e., the set Lω+1—is
not identical to what V thinks is ℘(Vω). If one assumes the validity of Set
Persistence, then, there is no variable-domain S5 model in which both L and V
are included in the domain of possible worlds.4
Now, recall that Wigglesworth is drawing metaphysical conclusions from
this formalism. If we follow Wigglesworth and take seriously the metaphysical
upshot of the foregoing observations, then accepting a principle like Res-WM
entails that it is metaphysically impossible that both L or V are models of
set theory. If one wishes to say with a straight face that L and V—or other
models, e.g., HOD—are coherent ways that the set-theoretical universe could
be, one must reject Set Persistence. In other words, if Res-WM does not
outright entail Platonism, it certainly runs dangerously close to Platonism. The
persistence criterion severely restricts the class of possible models of set theory.
For example, if one were to live in a pointwise definable universe—a model of set
theory in which every set was definable without parameters (cf. [3])—then Res-
WM would quite clearly entail the metaphysical impossibility of the existence of
an alternative model. In other words, a kind of set-theoretical actualism would
follow.
Although we stop well short of proof, the foregoing considerations raise the
specter of a dilemma facing attempts to repair Wigglesworth’s argument. If the
appropriate persistence criteria are too weak and do not hold for every set, then
the foregoing results suggest there will remain sets that do not ontologically
depend on their members. On the other hand, if one is to guarantee that all
3As the least inductive set, ω is definable in the language of set theory and for any definable
ordinal α, Vα and Lα are similarly definable. As the power set function is also definable,
there exists a formula in the language of set theory amounting to x = ℘(Vω). Cf. [5].
4Properly speaking, L and V are proper classes and S5 models are regarded as sets. How-
ever, this example can be rephrased as a prohibition against the sets Lω+2 and Vω+2 appear-
ing as possible worlds in a variable-domain S5 model.
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sets enjoy this ontological dependence, then the persistence criteria must be
strengthened to hold of the entire set-theoretic universe. In this case, one will
be forced to cordon off important (and prima facie coherent) corners of the
set-theoretic multiverse as metaphysically impossible.
4 Conclusions
The example of a set’s being ontologically dependent on its members is en-
trenched for a reason. Despite the fact that metaphysical grounding can at
times seem esoteric, the set-theoretical case provides a very salient and com-
pelling illustration of grounding. It is convenient that the theory of sets is
well-studied, as the clarity that the formalism of set theory provides has the
potential to aid in the clarification of grounding as a whole. Hence, it is likely
that, properly executed, the program initiated by Wigglesworth in [10] may ul-
timately bear more heavily on the general notion of grounding and the program
is thus worthy of further development.
Moreover, independently of the metaphysical notion of grounding, the frame-
work of modal logic has been fruitful in set theory proper. Kripke semantics
and possible worlds have been employed to examine large cardinal properties in
Andreas Blass’ [1], to explore the notion of forcing in Hamkins and Benedikt
Lo¨we’s [4], and to help elucidate the construction of Cohen models in Raymond
Smullyan and Melvin Fitting’s [9]. There is a tradition going back a quarter of
a century in which models of ZF and possible worlds have been harmoniously
deployed for purely mathematical pursuits. This suggests that deploying the
two in tandem for metaphysical pursuits has the potential to bear fruit as well.
In other words, the foregoing is not intended as an objection to the pro-
gram that Wigglesworth has initiated but rather as an observation that its
implementation is in need of revision. The mathematical evidence suggests that
there exists an adequate modal framework within which we may pose not only
questions about the grounding of sets, but of grounding in general. However,
the observations in this paper suggest that there remain a number of unsolved
and subtle problems before an adequate framework is reached.
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